Researchers Mathy Vanhoef and Frank Piessens, from the University of Leuven, identified a series of vulnerabilities that affect Wi-Fi Protected Access® (WPA™) and Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2™).  These vulnerabilities are protocol-level vulnerabilities that affect a number of industry implementations of the standard in wireless infrastructure devices and wireless clients. The paper is available through the following link:

The following Common Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE) identifiers have been assigned to each of these vulnerabilities:

  • CVE-2017-13077: reinstallation of the pairwise key in the Four-way handshake
  • CVE-2017-13078: reinstallation of the group key in the Four-way handshake
  • CVE-2017-13079: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the Four-way handshake
  • CVE-2017-13080: reinstallation of the group key in the Group Key handshake
  • CVE-2017-13081: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the Group Key handshake
  • CVE-2017-13082: accepting a retransmitted Fast BSS Transition Reassociation Request and reinstalling the pairwise key while processing it
  • CVE-2017-13084: reinstallation of the STK key in the PeerKey handshake
  • CVE-2017-13086: reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) PeerKey (TPK) key in the TDLS handshake
  • CVE-2017-13087: reinstallation of the group key (GTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame
  • CVE-2017-13088: reinstallation of the integrity group key (IGTK) when processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame

These vulnerabilities can be grouped into two categories: those that affect wireless endpoints acting as a “supplicant” and those that affect wireless infrastructure devices acting as “authenticators”. Depending on the specific device configuration, successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow unauthenticated attackers to perform packet replay, decrypt wireless packets, and to potentially forge or inject packets into a wireless network. This is accomplished by manipulating retransmissions of handshake messages.

ICASI members were notified by the researchers of these vulnerabilities.  With the permission of the researchers, the ICASI members notified the whole ICASI Membership through ICASI’s Unified Security Incident Response Plan (USIRP).  ICASI Members include A10 Networks, Amazon, Cisco Systems, IBM, Intel Corporation, Juniper Networks, Microsoft Corporation, Oracle Corporation and VMWare.  This notification enabled member Product Security Incident Response Teams (PSIRTs) to collaborate quickly and effectively to fully understand the vulnerabilities and their scope. Through this sharing, several additional ICASI members determined that they were impacted by these vulnerabilities and it was likely other industry companies were also impacted.  ICASI worked with the security researchers and CERT/CC to broadly reach out to possibly impacted companies. Impacted companies were offered a path to coordinate with other industry players through ICASI’s USIRP.  This coordination ultimately helped resolve this complex, multi-stakeholder security issue in a timely, coordinated manner.

ICASI would like to thank the security community members who coordinated with ICASI on this issue: Mathy Vanhoef, the researcher; CERT Coordination Center; and Wi-Fi Alliance. In addition, ICASI engaged with the following companies under a unique multi-party Non Disclosure Agreement: Aruba, Broadcom Corporation, Cypress Semiconductor, Google, Honeywell, Marvell Semiconductor, Mojo Networks, Peplink, Sierra Wireless, and WatchGuard.  ICASI also thanks Jouni Malinen, the hostapd provider, for his coordination and John Van Boxtel from Cypress who found that wpa supplicant 2.6 is also vulnerable to CVE-2017-13077.  This collaboration allowed stakeholders to coordinate disclosure and discuss the technical aspects of the vulnerability and respective fixes prior to public release of the vulnerabilities.

ICASI recommends that organizations contact vendors specifically to discuss whether and how they might be impacted.  The following are the security advisories from the affected ICASI member companies and partners who engaged with ICASI through the USIRP:

ICASI Members


Any questions about ICASI should be directed to ICASI Executive Director Scott Algeier at or +1703-385-4969.

This statement was updated at 1:00 pm Eastern on October 16, 2017 with information for impacted vendors.